

OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

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**MAY 8 1947**

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, ICAPS

FROM: Assistant Director, ORE

SUBJECT: Comments on "Transpositional Analysis Technique  
to the Solution of United States--USSR Problems"

1. The facts and conclusions in subject paper appear sound.
2. Among the advantages of such a project would be the following:
  - a. While there can be no doubt of the cynicism with which the Kremlin is capable of violating Marxist and Leninist principles when these principles conflict with Soviet national ambitions, nevertheless Marxism-Leninism is the official religion of the USSR, and constitutes the standard of morals and of values. For this reason, a close study of the teachings of Marx and Lenin, and of the manner in which these teachings have been applied to the practical problems of Soviet policy, would contribute substantially toward our ability to understand and anticipate this policy.
  - b. In addition to those aspects of Soviet policy attributable to Marxism and Leninism, there are numerous characteristics of Soviet thought and action which, it is believed, would be a rewarding field of study for competent experts. Because of the autocratic and rigid pattern which runs through Soviet bureaucracy, there seems to be an ever-increasing tendency toward standardization in every phase of intellectual activity. If this be true, then the official Kremlin mentality should lend itself readily to systematic analysis.
  - c. Aside from the applicability of such a project to the USSR, there is a general consideration regarding the plan suggested which deserves attention. The number of competent intelligence analysts presently in Government service is extremely limited. This is particularly true of those devoting their

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attention to the USSR. The result is that their time and energy is concentrated almost entirely on the myriad of day-to-day problems involved in analyzing and reporting current developments. Few, if any, are in a position to view the broader aspects of the situation with that detachment and leisure necessary for an analysis of major long-range trends. If a staff of competent experts could be assembled and freed from administrative and current intelligence responsibilities, they could in all probability, make a substantial contribution to our USSR intelligence.

3. In considering the project, however, it is believed that account should be taken of certain adverse factors, including the following:

- a. The difficulty which any Westerner, no matter how well versed in Russian history, Soviet theory, etc., would encounter in attempting to duplicate the thinking processes of the men on the Politburo. Not only have these men been conditioned by an atmosphere almost incomprehensible to the West, but we have no way of knowing just what information, misinformation, and distortions of information reach the top of the Soviet bureaucratic maze and form the basis of Moscow policy.
- b. Because of the shortage of competent personnel mentioned in paragraph 2(c) above, it would be difficult adequately to staff such a project without stripping the Government Departments of men vitally needed for more immediate responsibilities.

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